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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of corporate governance on bank performance in Nigeria 
during the period 2005 to 2009 based on a sample of six selected banks listed on Nigerian 
Stock Exchange market making use of pooled time series data. Form the findings, we observe 
that corporate governance have been on the low side and have impacted negatively on bank 
performance.  The study therefore contends that strategic training for board members and 
senior bank managers should be embarked or improved upon, especially on courses that 
promote corporate governance and banking ethics.  
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Introduction 
The importance of a vibrant, transparent and healthy banking system in the 
mobilization and intermediation of fund, for the growth and development of the economy 
need not be over-emphasised. Worthy of is the fact that the level of functioning of the 
financial sector depend on the perception and patronage of the citizens towards its services 
(Al- Faki, 2006).  The situation where the public losses confidence in the financial 
institutions, can result in panic and consequential financial and economic woes. The absence 
of confidence in any organisation is attributable to opaque management practices with 
deleterious effect on its performance. The measure of performance in this case is not limited 
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to the financials (turnover and profit) but also customer satisfaction, employee welfare, social 
corporate responsibility, indeed, the whole gamut of balanced score card.  
 There are many ways of defining corporate governance, ranging from narrow 
definitions that focus on companies and their shareholders, to broader definitions that 
incorporate the accountability of companies to many other groups of people, or 
‘stakeholders’.  The Cadbury Report (1992) was set up by the Committee on the Financial 
Aspects of Corporate Governance, known as the Cadbury Committee in May 1991 by the 
Financial Reporting Council, the London Stock Exchange, and the accountancy profession. 
The report made far reaching recommendations on corporate governance concerning the way 
in which companies are directed and controlled. The central components of the voluntary 
code of corporate practice are: that there be a clear division of responsibilities at the top, 
primarily that the position of Chairman of the Board be separated from that of Chief 
Executive, or that there be a strong independent element on the board; that the majority of the 
Board be comprised of outside directors; that remuneration committees for Board members 
be made up in the majority of non-executive directors; and that the Board should appoint an 
Audit Committee including at least three non-executive directors. 
 Corporate performance is an important concept that relates to the way and manner in 
which financial, material and human resources available to an organization are judiciously 
used to achieve the overall corporate objective of an organization. It keeps the organization in 
business and creates a greater prospect for future opportunities. The overall effect of good 
corporate governance should be the strengthening of investor’s confidence in the economy of 
our country. Corporate governance is therefore about building credibility, ensuring 
transparency and accountability as well maintaining an effective channel of information 
disclosure that would foster good corporate performance. It is therefore crucial that banking 
sector observe a strong corporate governance ethos.  
 Massive corporate collapses resulting from weak systems of corporate governance 
have highlighted the need to improve and reform corporate governance at an international 
level. The Enron in the USA, Cadbury in Nigeria and other similar cases around the world 
have led to enactment of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act in July 2002 in the USA, the Higgs Report 
and the Smith Reports in 2003 in the UK and the st-code for corporate governance for banks 
in Nigeria which became operational in 2006 amongst others.Corporate governance is the 
system of checks and balances, both internal and external to companies, which ensures that 
companies discharge their accountability to all their stakeholders and act in a socially 
responsible way in all areas of their business activity (Solomon and Solomon, 2004).  
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 The Nigerian banking system has undergone remarkable changes over the years in 
terms of the number of institution, ownership structure and the depth and breadth of the 
operations. These changes have been influenced largely by the opportunities presented by the 
deregulation of the financial sector, globalization of operations, technological advancements, 
impact of global economic downturn and the adoption of regulatory guidelines that conform 
to international standards. The developments in the Nigerian banking industry show that 
absence of good corporate governance was mainly responsible for the dismal performance of 
the industry as a catalyst for economic growth. In 1992, Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International (including its Nigerian affiliate) went bust and lost billions of dollars for its 
depositors, shareholders and employees. Another company, Polly Peck, reported healthy 
profits in 1992 while declaring bankruptcy the next year. 
 Given the nature of banking business and the antecedents of the operators such as 
unrecoverable loans, unethical bank practices, illiquidity, etc of Nigeria banks, corporate 
governance is fundamental to the nation’s financial stability Afrinvest, (2010). Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) opined that effective corporate governance reduces control rights, 
shareholders and creditors confer on managers, increasing the probability that managers 
invest in positive net present value projects. Thus, the relationship of the board and 
management, according to Al-faki (2006), should be characterized by transparency to 
shareholders, and fairness to other stakeholders. 
 This study will add to the general body of knowledge, on the impact of corporate 
governance and performance of banks in Nigeria; which is a very sensitive and vital sector. It 
also expands the body of literature in terms of its scope in integrating both bank internal 
factor, regulatory factor and the economic factor that may mitigate bank performance. 
Narrowing to sectorial macro analysis, picking Six Banks; 2 first generation, 2 new 
generation and 2 middle generation banks; In order to make a generalization on corporate 
governance level in the banking industry of Nigeria, as such seem limited in corporate 
governance literature in Nigeria. 
 Considering the sensitivity of the subject area of corporate governance, and the 
limitation of gaining access to relevant materials, this study will cover and review corporate 
governance and performance of six major banks in Nigeria {First Bank of Nigeria Plc, United 
Bank of Africa (UBA), EcoBank, Fidelity Bank, First City Monument Bank (FCMB), and 
Guarantee Trust Bank (GTB)} in the post consolidation era- 2005 to 2009.  
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The data used for this study, were retrieved majorly from Annual reports of the six banks, the 
Central Bank of Nigeria Annual statistical Bulletins, financial summary of listed banks on the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange, and other published articles. 
 
Review Of Literature 
The word governance is synonymous with the exercise of authority, direction and 
control. Zingales (1998) defined corporate governance as a group of mechanism that 
stakeholders use to guarantee that directors effectively manage corporate resources, a task 
that include the way in which quassi rents are developed and distributed. Metrick and Ishil 
(2002) see corporate governance from the investors’ perspective as “both the promise to 
repay a fair return on capital invested and the commitment to operate a firm, efficiently given 
investments.” Grevning and Bratonovic (1999) stress the partnership approach to corporate 
governance in which each player has a defined accountability for specific dimension of every 
responsibility area. This extends to identification and allocation of task as part of corporate 
governance process. They identify six key players in the corporate governance to include the 
market regulations/supervisors, shareholders, board of directors, executive managements, 
audit committee, external auditors and the public/ consumers. 
 Yermack  (1996), in a review of the earlier work of Monks and Mino (1995), argues 
that large boardrooms tend to be slow in making decisions, and hence can be an obstacle to 
change. A second reason for the support for small board size is that directors rarely criticize 
the policies of top managers and this problem tends to increase with the number of directors 
(Yermack, 1996; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). Yermack (1996) examines the relation between 
board size and firm performance, concluding that the smaller the board size the better the 
performance, and proposing an optimal board size of ten or fewer. John and Senbet (1998) 
maintain that the findings of Yermack have important implications, not least because they 
may call for the need to depend on forces outside the market system in order to determine the 
size of the board. 
 Oyejide and Soyibo (200l) review the corporate governance legislation In Nigeria 
focusing on the financial performance. Adams and Mehram (2002) study on a sample of bank 
holding, they examine the effect of “boardsize and "board composition” as measure of 
corporate governance on value. Their results explain the absence of robust relationship 
between board composition and value and a positive relationship between board size and 
value in contract with the abundant existing literature for non- financial firms. The result of 
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Adams and Mehram (2002) indicates the inherent complexity of monitoring and advising 
financial entities. 
 Two recent studies by Beltratti and Stulz (2010) and Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) 
analyze the influence of corporate governance on bank performance during the credit crisis. 
However, both studies rely on variables that have been used in the literature to analyze the 
relation between corporate governance and firm value of non-financial institutions. 
Specifically, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) analyze the influence of CEO incentives and share 
ownership on bank performance and find no evidence for a better performance of banks in 
which the incentives provided by the CEO‟s pay package are stronger (i.e., the fraction of 
equity-based compensation is higher).  In fact, their evidence rather points to banks providing 
stronger incentives to CEOs performing worse in the crisis. A possible explanation for this 
finding is that CEOs may have focused on the interests of shareholders in the build-up to the 
crisis and took actions that they believed the market would welcome. Ex-post, however, these 
actions were costly to their banks and their shareholders when the results turned out to be 
poor. Moreover, their results indicate that option-based compensation had no negative 
influence on bank performance, that bank CEOs did not reduce their stock holdings in 
anticipation of the crisis, and that CEOs did not hedge their holdings. Hence, their results 
suggest that bank CEOs did not anticipate the crisis and the resulting poor performance of the 
banks as they suffered huge losses themselves. 
 Erkens, Hung, and Matos (2010) use an international sample of 296 financial firms 
from 30 countries. Consistent with Beltratti and Stulz (2010), they find that firms with more 
independent boards and higher institutional ownership experienced worse stock returns 
during the crisis. They argue that firms with higher institutional ownership took more risk 
prior to the crisis which resulted in larger shareholder losses during the crisis period. 
Moreover, firms with more independent boards raised more equity capital during the crisis, 
which led to a wealth transfer from existing shareholders to debt holders. 
Methodology  
 The broad objective of this study is to examine the impact of corporate governance 
and performance of bank in Nigeria. The analysis is conducted on a sample of six banks 
(First Bank, United Bank of Africa (UBA), EcoBank, Fidelity Bank, First City Monument 
Bank (FCMB) and Guarantee Trust Bank (GTB)) available on the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
Fact Book (2009). The sample period is 2005-2009. The data was extracted from Nigerian 
Stock Exchange Fact Book (2009) and it comprises the earnings for the year 2005-2009as 
measured by profit after tax. The interest rate policy reform is captured by a dummy variable 
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(0- regulated interest rate and 1-deregulated interest rate policy), while the inflation rate, Real 
Gross Domestic Product (RGDP), Broad Money Supply (M2), and Inflation rate are collected 
from the Annual Statistical Bulletin of the Central Bank of Nigeria. The model is then 
specified as: 
BankPefit = β0 + β1CorpGovit + β2IntrRft + β3M2t +β4GDPt + β5Infltt + u……….. (1)  
 Expressing the model in logarithm form; thus, taking accounts of the variable in 
ratios, or their growth rates. 
Log(BankPefit) = β0 + β1log(CorpGovit) + β2Intrdumi*t + β3log(M2i*t) +β4log(GDPi*t) + 
β5Inflti*t + u. 
 Where:  
 logcorpgov = corporate governance  
 inflt  = Inflation  
 intrdum = interest rate policy reform  
 RGDP  = Real Gross Domestic Product  
 β1-β6= parameter coefficients of the model and 
  i*t  =  time script of common variables across the cross section 
 U = random term. 
 From our cross-sectional or pooled time series model specification above, we have a 
pooled time series regression model, to estimate the parameters of the model, we apply the 
Pooled-Time Series Ordinary Least Square (OLS). After which a Panel data fixed estimate is 
applied to compare the estimated parameter values. The choice of these estimates measures is 
predicated on the structure of the research work and the building up of available data, and the 
given limited number of estimation technique that can be employed on such pooled-cross 
sectional data as employed in this study. 
Discussion Of Findings 
 From the estimated model as shown in Table 1, using the Pooled OLS, it is observed 
that three of the five independent variables are significant at 5%. Theoretically and 
practically, it is expected that corporate governance “if Good”, would increase the 
performance of banks as indicated by their profitability and “if Bad”, the reverse should be 
the case. The background of this study, reports that corporate governance in the banking 
sector given the period of 2005 to 2009, has been catastrophic resulting to the emergency 
intervention of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and the Nigerian Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (NDIC) in forming the AMCON (Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria) in 
June 2010. From our empirical findings, we concur that, corporate governance in Nigeria has 
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been poor and have had a negative effect on the performance of the banks. This is indicated 
by the negative relationship coefficient of -2.38652, implying that as poor corporate 
governance increases, the performance of the banks falls. This conclusion is significant at 5% 
and reliable. Bad corporate governance reduces the confidence of the public in the financial-
banking sector of the economy and thus a fall in savings, bank productivity, profit, fewer 
investable fund, investment and invariably aggregate production and output in the economy. 
Increasing rate of inflation affected bank performance negatively as expected, also significant 
at 5%, it effect stood at -0.1888, inferring that a one percent increase in inflation rate, results, 
to approximately 1.89% fall in the performance of the selected banks. The magnitude and 
sign of interest rate policy control of the CBN, suggest that the policy has not been too 
favourable on the banks performance. It indicates a negative relationship between the interest 
rate policy and the performance of banks. The other variable of the model (GDP and M2) 
were reported to be insignificant by the study. The variables of the model account for 50% 
variations in the dependent variable as indicated by the R-squared, implying a fair goodness 
of fit. The Durbin-Watson (DW) value seems okay at approximately two. The remaining 50 
percent variation in the dependent variable can be accounted to other factors like gains from 
advances, loans and the ability of the banks to expand their gains from transactions. 
Table 1: Pooled OLS 
Dependent variable: Log(bankpef) 
 Coefficient t-ratio p-value 
Const 26.5832 0.2613 0.7960 
Log(corpgov) -2.38652 -2.3725 0.0260** 
Log(gdp) -2.63212 -0.2751 0.7855 
Log(m2) 2.27616 1.2730 0.2152 
Inflt -0.188892 -2.7660 0.0107** 
Intrdum -2.15494 -2.1290 0.0437** 
Note: *, **, and ***, indicates significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
R-squared 0.5005 Durbin-Watson (DW) 2.004 Adjusted R-squared  0.3965 
Source: Author’s Computation 
Log(bankpef) = 26.6 -2.39*log(corpgov) -2.63*log(gdp) + 2.28*log(m2) - 0.189*inflt - 
2.15*intrdum 
             (102)                  (1.01)            (9.57)             (1.79)                 (0.06)          
(1.01) 
n = 30, R-squared = 0.501. (standard errors in parentheses). 
Table 2:Fixed-effects 
Dependent variable: Log(bankpef) 
 Coefficient t-ratio p-value 
Const 27.5783 0.2477 0.8070 
Log(corpgov) -2.5481 -2.2558 0.0360** 
Log(gdp) -2.7184 -0.2596 0.7979 
Log(m2) 2.3159 1.1831 0.2513 
Inflt -0.1905 -2.5488 0.0196** 
Intrdum -2.1768 -1.9645 0.0642* 
Note: *, **, and ***, indicates significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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R-squared  0.5265 Adjusted R-squared  0.2774 Durbin-Watson 2.007 
Source: Author’s Computation 
 The panel fixed effect estimation, reports a very similar result as the Pooled OLS. It 
also reports the same three variables of corporate governance (logcorpgov), Inflation (inflt) 
and interest rate policy reform (intrdum) has been significant, this time at 5%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. Same also, it reports that corporate governance in the selected banks have been 
poor and have a negative relationship with the performance of the banks as measured by the 
profit after tax. The poor corporate governance is evident by the negative sign of the 
coefficient (-2.5481), slightly different from that reported by the pooled OLS by 
approximately 0.2. Further the same is the negative relationship between inflation and the 
performance of the banks (-0.1888), which when compared to the earlier report 
approximately, we find no difference. Lastly, the interest rate policy was not left out in this 
chain of conformity. It also suggest a negative relationship to the dependent variable (-
2.1549), almost showing no divergence from the coefficient of the variable when estimated 
using the Pooled Ordinary Least Square. The goodness of fit, R-squared measured fairly this 
time at 52% and the Durbin-Watson approximately two.  
 
Conclusion 
 Form the findings, we observe that corporate governance have been on the low side 
and have impacted negatively on bank performance. Considering the grievous consequence 
of poor corporate governance on the confidence of the public, and the economy at large, this 
study therefore recommends that strategic training for board members and senior bank 
managers should be embarked or improved upon, especially on courses that promote 
corporate governance and banking ethics.  Also, the regulatory and supervisory authorities 
should be more cautious in the scrutinizing the account books of banks and also make more 
frequent examination of the bank’s asset base and liquidity stance.  
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